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INTRODUCTION
International action for trade liberalisation has takenvarious forms, particularly since 1945, that is, since theUN era. Not all aspects of it have been successful for a
variety of reasons – either they failed to satisfy the
requirements of both rich and poor countries, or the
fundamental issues have not been clearly identified.
Furthermore, the remit of trade liberalisation in many
instances has been kept confined to tariff reductions or
most-favoured nation standard, or by short-term bilateral
preferential arrangements, or by a generalised system of
preferences (GSP), or a combination of all these forms of
trade preferences. None of these arrangements has dealt
with the fundamental issues responsible for the hindrances
encountered primarily by developing countries in
participating as actors on the international markets.
The issue of trade liberalisation may in certain cases be
hindered by regional arrangements, as these arrangements
are obliged to offer preferential treatment to their
Members first. Interestingly enough, regional
arrangements consisting of developing countries have not
been remarkably successful because of lack of leadership or
coherent policies, or in many cases inadequate capability to
manufacture products of the quality required for markets
in the developed world. Alternatively, the markets in the
developed world present two main challenges; they are
either near-saturated, or capable of manufacturing their
own goods and therefore not in need of any products,
unless of a unique nature, from the developing world.
Thus, the prospect of the developing world participating in
the markets of the developed world becomes remote.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001 ( the texts of
the Declaration have been reproduced in 41 International
Legal Materials 746 (2002)) seems to have identified some
of the crucial issues with which international trade
liberalisation should be concerned and at the same time
create awareness in developing countries as to what they
should do in order to improve their position in regard to
international trading and domestic trading. It is the
purpose of this article to analyse critically the Doha
Declaration, 2001.
THE SCENARIO
International trade liberalisation is concerned with
many issues, but the two most important issues are: (a) to
create opportunities for market access for all states; and (b)
to operate international trade on the basis of “equality in
fact” rather than “equality in law”, whereby the less
privileged will be allowed to have extra trade-based
preferences to be able to compete with their competitors.
These statements further entail two issues: (a) what is the
difference between them; and (b) how to create
opportunities for market access for all states? As to the first
issue, the answer was given by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Minority Schools in Albania case
(PCIJ A/B 64 (1935)). In this case, the Government of
Albania, in breach of its obligations with the League
Assembly under the Mandate system, amended its
constitution whereby all children, both of the majority and
minority would go state schools. All private schools,
including the schools of the Albanian minorities were
closed down. The latter contested the Albanian
Government’s act, and complained to the League
Assembly, which sought an advisory opinion of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. In dealing with
the Albanian act, the court deliberated on the legal
distinction between “equality in law” and “equality in
fact”. According to the court:
“Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind;
whereas equality in fact may involve the necessity of different
in order to attain a result which established an equilibrium
between different situations.”
In its Advisory Opinion of September 10, 1923
concerning the case of the German Settlers in Poland
(Opinion No. 6) it was stated that:
“There must be equality in fact as well as ostensible legal
equality in the sense of the absence of discrimination in the
words of the law.”
The court’s view in the Minority Schools case is worth
following in relation to trade relationship between
developed and developing countries. Developing countries,
although constituting the majority, in effect, are in a
minority situation compared to the developed states. Thus,
the necessity of different treatment in their favour may be
justified. Different treatment in this context would mean
market access to reserved markets, that is, markets
primarily meant for the member states of a regional
economic integration.
The second issue entails two sub-issues: (a) the creation
of market access by a deliberate international policy
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determined at an international forum; and (b) to develop
the capacity for the less privileged or less capable in order
to ensure that they can enter the markets, that is, by
strengthening their infrastructure. This latter sub-issue is
extremely important in ensuring that developing countries
have market access. It is maintained that so far
international action for trade liberalisation has not
effectively been directed at this issue. Although the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 1974 did address
the matter, unfortunately none of the developed states,
except for Australia, accepted this resolution. The remit of
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is much wider than
that of GATT, but its objectives and performance have
been subject to controversies. This is not the appropriate
context to deal with this issue; suffice it to say that WTO’s
activities have already attracted sufficient controversy.
For the first time in the history of international action
for trade liberalisation the Doha Ministerial Declaration
2001 identified most of the crucial issues with which an
international trade liberalisation programme should be
concerned. This is not to undermine the relentless efforts
made by UNCTAD in achieving trade liberalisation
through the Generalised Systems of Preferences (GSP) or
by upholding the cause of developing countries by other
means, such as tariff reductions or adding Part IV to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The
Doha Declaration was the latest attempt made by the
WTO to achieve international trade liberalisation.
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DOHA
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION, 2001
At Doha, several other Declarations were adopted in
addition to the Ministerial Declaration:
• Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, 14 November 2001;
• Declaration on Implementation-related Issues and
Concerns of 14 November 2001;
• Declaration on Procedure for Extensions under Article
27 for certain Developing Country Members of 14
November 2001;
• Declaration on European Communities (EC) – The
ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, 14 November 2001;
• Declaration on European Communities (EC) –
Transitional Regime for the EC Autonomous Tariff Rate
Quotas on Imports of Bananas of 14 November 2001.
It is not possible to deal with all these Declarations in
the space of an article, and it has thus been decided to
discuss the principal Declaration as it incorporated most of
the important trade and investment-related issues,
although references will be made to the other Declarations
where necessary.
The Doha Ministerial Declarations were based on the
principles and objectives set out in the Marakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, and
the conviction that protectionism should be rejected. One
of the principal objectives of the Ministerial Declaration is
to gain enhanced market access and trade liberalisation for
developing countries and, in particular, the least developed
countries.
The programme of work conceived by the Doha
Ministerial Declaration contains most of the important
issues for trade liberalisation, albeit long-awaited. It was
developed under the following main sub-headings:
• agriculture;
• services;
• market access for non-agricultural products;
• trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (not
discussed in this article);
• relationship between trade and investment;
• interaction between trade and competition policy;
• transparency in government procurement;
• trade facilitation;
• dispute settlement understanding;
• trade and environment;
• electronic commerce;
• trade economies;
• trade, debt and finance;
• trade and transfer of technology;
• technical co-operation and capacity building;
• least developed countries and special and differential
treatment.
Only the most important aspects of these items are now
discussed.
It is interesting to see that agriculture has appropriately
received priority consideration in the Declaration.
Agriculture is the primary sector of the economy of all
countries, rich or poor alike. The latter, in particular, have
virtually lost market access because all developed countries
are advanced in their agricultural sectors and able to
saturate or near-saturate their markets. Furthermore,
market distortions, particularly in respect of pricing, and
quality of product restrictions, often take place. The
Declaration aims (at 748) at establishing:
“a fair and market-oriented trading system through a
programme of fundamental reform encompassing strengthened
rules and specific commitments on support and protection in
order to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in
world agricultural markets.”
The Declaration recognises that special and differential
treatment for developing countries shall be an integral
aspect of all negotiations on agricultural issues. It also 23
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recognises that modalities should be agreed to for ensuring
market access for
non-agricultural products particularly from developing
countries by reducing or eliminating high tariffs, tariff
escalation and non-tariff barriers. The aim to enhance the
position of developing and least developed countries by
“capacity building” in consequence of which their ability to
compete with developed countries is laudable, although the
process is lengthy and perhaps uncertain.
The Declaration provides for “trade facilitation”,
although it does not define it. In conformity with its
etymological meaning, trade facilitation would include:
reduction or elimination of administrative formalities;
expediting release and clearance of goods, including goods
in transit; customs formalities, and other barriers which
prevent an easy access to overseas markets. As a measure of
facilitation of trade, the Declaration had as its objectives to
clarify and improve disciplines under the Agreements on
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures taking into account
the needs of developing and least-developed countries.
The Declaration identified the co-relationship between
trade, debt and finance, although it does not elaborate on
this issue. This is one of the crucial issues that a vast
majority of countries experience. Ideally, there should be a
coherence of international trade and financial policies.
Without a state monetary and financial policy, which is the
responsibility of a government, a country’s gains from
external trade may not be significant. Most of the
developing countries lack coherence in international trade
and financial policies. This is where much work is
necessary at national level, and governments should
consider seeking technical assistance from the relevant
international organisations, in particular, the International
Monetary Fund. Although sustainable monetary and
financial policies are essential for every country, it is
questionable whether the implementation of these policies
alone may enhance the trading position of countries,
particularly when most of the markets in the Western
world are near-saturated. This issue is further considered
in the conclusion of this article.
Trade and transfer of technology is another issue which
is close to the heart of the issue of economic development.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration supported the idea of
increasing flows of technology to developing countries. It
must be seriously considered whether an increased flow of
technology may necessarily contribute to the development
process in a developing country. Firstly, the acquisition of
foreign technology overburdens the debts of a poor
country, and technology transferred to developing
countries is often used or re-conditioned; secondly, a
developing country should be deterred from joining a high
technology race as such a race will always be between the
equals and unequals. Instead, technical assistance should
be provided to developing countries whereby they may be
able to develop their indigenous technology, according to
their needs. Eventually, they should be able to strengthen
their technological capacity.
The Doha Declaration rightly emphasised the need for
technical co-operation and capacity building. This is
particularly important for the small and least-developed
economies, as otherwise they may not be able to
participate in the multilateral trading system. It is also
interesting to note that the Doha Declaration
recommended special and differential treatment for
developing countries, particularly least-developed
countries. It further recommended that privity should also
be allowed to small, vulnerable and transition economies.
The Doha Declaration acknowledged the seriousness of
the concerns expressed by the least developed countries in
the Zanzibar Declaration adopted by their ministers in July
2001, and recognised that the integration of the least
developed countries into the multilateral trading system
required meaningful market access, support for the
diversification of their production, and export base, and
trade-related technical assistance and capacity building.
Doha also re-affirmed provisions for special and
differential treatment as an integral part of the WTO
Agreements; it supported such treatment in favour of
developing, and in particular the least-developed countries,
and expressed the view that all special and differential
treatment provisions should be reviewed with a view to
making them precise, effective and operational. The
Declaration also endorsed the work programme on special
and differential treatment set out in the Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.
Incidentally, some WTO members proposed a Framework
Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment
(WT/GG/W/442).
The document entitled Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/17) also decided on certain
issues, and particular agreement on:
• Agriculture;
• Textiles and clothing;
• Technical barriers to trade;
• Trade-related investments measures;
• Subsidies and countervailing measures;
• Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPS).
The basic themes of these decisions were to recognise
the plight of developing countries in international trade
and provide technical assistance to improve their
competitive position where necessary. This issue of
subsidies allowed by developed countries remains a matter
of common concern for developing countries.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration was a comprehensive,
albeit over-ambitious, framework meant for allowing24
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developing countries to participate as meaningful actors on
the international trade market. But, strictly speaking, Doha
mostly acknowledged and/or recognised the issues with
which developing countries generally were concerned for
enhanced market access, but it may be maintained that
there was no consensus among developed countries that
they would eventually commit themselves to these issues.
Furthermore, the economic interests of developed
countries were also varied; for example, what the EU as a
trading bloc might agree, other developed countries might
not do so. This also became evident at the Cancún
Conference. Doha predominantly identified the aspirations
of developing countries to use trade as an important factor
of development, thus, enhanced market access of their
products proves to be essential for them, whereas
developed countries do not usually encounter much
difficulty in gaining market access for their high-technology
based products. Developing countries thus need
concessions for market access for their agricultural or high-
technology based products with which developed
countries’ markets are already near-saturated.
THE ROAD FOR DOHA TO CANCÚN
As stated earlier, Doha identified the aspirations of
developing countries, Cancún was supposed to materialise
them. However, a considerable amount of preparatory
work for that outcome was necessary before proceeding
towards Cancún. The deadlock on the Singapore issues,
particularly in respect of agriculture and trade distorting
subsidies and the fundamental differences in Geneva gave
an early signal of the predictable failure at Cancún.
The journey from Doha to Cancún may be described as
a journey from the South to the North. It is bumpy and
uncertain journey – uncertain in that the reaction of the
developed countries to the proposals put forward by
developing countries was not foreseen. Developing
countries took it for granted that Cancún would resolve all
their problems, without appreciating that the developed
states may have to protect their interests too.
The lack of achievement at Singapore and Geneva should
have been reflected upon. From this point of view, the
journey to Cancún was premature; the fundamental issues
should have been considered seriously, and policies set out.
The key issues were subsidies by rich countries; dumping
of products on developing countries’ markets; the adverse
effect of regional economic arrangements constituted of
developed countries on developing countries; the extent to
which protection of the agriculture sector by both
developed and developing countries should be viable;
capacity building by developing countries; and trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights
The implementation of both Ministerial Declarations
will thus remain incomplete until these fundamental issues
among others have been openly discussed by both
developed and developing countries. Doha clearly
identified the issues which, unless correctly dealt with, will
never allow developing countries to fulfil any role as actors
on international markets. Among these, the issue of
technical co-operation and capacity building should be
prioritised. It must be re-iterated that the identification of
issues and problems is merely preliminary to appropriate
policy making; it does not provide remedies, and in seeking
a holistic view of the problems of both parties, developed
and developing countries should be taken into account.
CANCÚN AND THE FUTURE OF A
MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM
The aim of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún,
Mexico in September 2003 was to evaluate the progress
achieved through the Doha Round in November 2001.
The Cancún Conference ended abruptly because it failed
to reach a consensus among the members of the WTO on
the contents of the draft Declaration. A degree of bi-
polarisation took place at Cancún between the developing
countries which refused to allow concessions on the issues
of competition policy at Singapore – trade facilitation,
investment and a greater transparency in respect of
procurement system operated by government – and the
lack of commitments on the part of the European Union
and the United States on the time scale and date for ending
farm subsidies. Basically, it ended up as a deadlock of
North-South dialogue on issues of international trade.
Whereas the Doha Ministerial Declarations were
thought to have formed the bases for further negotiations
and implementation of trade policies, the Cancún Round
sapped the foundations of the Doha Round – unless the
international community decides to return to Doha.
Agriculture became the central issue at Cancún, whereas
the developing countries proposed a greater access to the
markets of developed countries by requiring the latter to
end subsidies on agricultural products, the developed
countries failed to effectively respond to that proposal. The
recent reform of the European Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) for the reduction of direct subsidies to
farmers did not satisfy the developing countries. Failure at
Cancún was predictable
The Doha Round established the framework of
international trade; Cancún was supposed to be a follow-
up to Doha. But, on the other hand, Cancún’s agenda was
effectively diverted into the old scores between developed
and developing countries. Whereas developing countries
worked to see “development” as a result of trade,
developed countries were seemingly concerned with trade.
Thus, developing countries maintained that the issue of
development should be incorporated into the multilateral
system on which there was no consensus among developed
countries. The issue of the availability of medicines
requiring flexibility in the TRIPS (Trade-related aspects of
international property rights) – which is another primary
negotiation item – did not receive any serious attention
from Cancún. Although “development” was to be the 25
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central issue at Cancún, no appropriate preparatory action
was taken to pay account to that.
The reason why failure at Cancún was predictable was
that the developing countries have failed to appreciate that
agriculture and agriculture-related products are the
principal sectors of their economies which engage a large
number of farmers. These sectors are so important that
governments keep them going by providing subsidies,
which developing countries may not be able to do in the
near future. Furthermore, the reality is that the developed
countries are so advanced in their agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors that they do not usually need any
foreign agricultural products; their markets are already
saturated. Thus, developed countries have difficulties in
allowing developing countries concessions, unless they are
able to receive them on a bilateral basis. This is where
developing countries are required to exercise their
bargaining power, preferably by assuring them of
something (goods or services) or setting up industries in
return.
Furthermore, the interests of developing countries are
diverse; it is difficult, if
not impossible, to accommodate them in any one
agreement, which the developing countries primarily
wanted through a multilateral framework. The failure of
Cancún was predictable to the extent that developing
countries themselves would not have a consensus on trade
and development issues bearing in mind their diverse
demands and requirements, and that developed countries
are, for practical reasons, unable to accommodate all
demands and requirements.
WHAT WAS ACHIEVED AT CANCÚN
Developing countries, by and large, wanted an extension
of the Doha Development Agenda at Cancún, but the latter
effectively turned out to be a platform for bringing out the
differences between the developed and developing
countries on specific issues in which both parties have
interests of a fundamental nature. Cancún clearly revealed
once again North-South divide on fundamental issues. The
diverse requirements and demands of developing countries
also became apparent at Cancún.
Whereas countries such as Argentina, Brazil or Thailand
have interests in obtaining market access for their globally-
competitive exports, including their agricultural products,
some other developing countries are still food-importers,
and others would like to protect their agricultural sector
from foreign agricultural products. Developed countries,
on the other hand, have uniformly wanted to protect their
agricultural sectors, and to expand their export markets.
A number of developing countries, including many
belonging to ACP, wanted to
protect and continue with their preferential
arrangements with rich countries, and particularly EU
countries. Indeed the EU lends its support for market
liberalisation in general, which issue was clearly brought
out by four Western and Central African countries. At
Cancún, despite their variety of interests, developing
countries clearly identified the need for providing
protection and market access to their agricultural products.
Brazil, China and India also identified other issues apart
from agriculture.
Cancún revealed that the developing countries need
more convincing arguments to win the minds of developed
countries in support of their cause. WTO/GATT is a
consensus-based organisation; participant countries, both
developed and developing, are required to realise that
unless a proposal is acceptable to both parties, it will be
rejected. That is precisely what happened at Cancún. This
is also where difficulties lie in having a consensus-based
multilateral system. Well-thought out plans and strategies
are necessary to achieve anything on a consensus basis; this
was not done as a preparatory requirement for meeting at
Cancún. Furthermore, the grounds for a consensus should
also be clearly thought out bearing in mind the competing
interests of other parties (currently, WTO has 146
members). Interestingly enough, the ACP Group, the
African Union and the least developed countries met and
agreed to present their case jointly on issues such as
agriculture, non-agricultural products, the Singapore issues
and, of course, development issues, issues of differential
treatment, small economies debt, transfer of technology,
capability building, technical assistance, rules on original
trade agreements etc. But, unfortunately, their ideas were
not regarded by others at the conference from the same
standpoint.
CONCLUSIONS
It would be inappropriate to evaluate Cancún in terms
of success or failure. Cancún was prematurely held. The
gulf between the developed and developing countries in
trade-related matters is almost unbridgeable. The national
interests of individual and regional economies are often at
odds with the issues of multilateral or trade liberalisation.
Certain common issues between developed and
developing countries exist in relation to foreign trade. Both
groups of countries would like to preserve their
agricultural sectors even by providing subsidies to their
farmers. The Subsidy Code of Conduct and subsequently
the Subsidy Agreement did not change the situation
significantly. The most that developing countries can sell to
the developed markets are quality agricultural products;
but as stated earlier, these markets are near-saturated with
the products produced by developed countries. Unless
special resources dictate it, the agricultural sector has
usually been a closed sector for both developed and
developing countries. Neither GATT nor WTO has been
able to successfully deal with the subsidy issue. About half
of the EU’s annual budget is allocated to agricultural26
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primarily to protect the EU farmers; the European market
is known for having food mountains.
Other rich countries, such as, Australia, Canada, Japan,
New Zealand and the United States have significant
agricultural sectors. They may not be expected to sacrifice
their agriculture sectors to developing countries. In fact,
developing countries should, on the other hand, ensure
that food products are not dumped by rich countries on
their markets, as dumping of these products will adversely
affect developing countries economies.
In view of their high costs of production owing to high
labour charges, and often not protected by subsidies,
textile products, which are of high quality in most of the
developing countries, have been allowed market access in
the West. This also proves another issue, that is, with
proper training and skills, developing countries can
effectively have market access. Therefore, the issue remains
whether developing countries should acquire technical
assistance to improve their skills instead of seeking
concessions from external sources.
The consensus-based institution GATT was set up in
1947 with a view to providing multinationalism in trade.
GATT also provided for preferential trading arrangements.
But if one takes stock, it can easily be seen what GATT
actually achieved. Furthermore, international trade on a
most-favoured nation basis can never create commercial
equality (see S K Chatterjee, “Forty Years of International
Action for Trade Liberalisation” in the Journal of World Trade,
(1989), in which the author details the nature of
international action for trade liberalisation between 1945
and 1985, at pp 45-6). The proposal for granting a
generalised system of preferences (GSP) by UNCTAD for
products of developing countries presented a problem for
GATT, particularly because the Agreement did not provide
for such preferences, and that notwithstanding that the
rule under Article XXX would not allow any such proposal
to be approved.
GSP was finally granted under an enabling clause, and
excluding agricultural products. According to its terms,
GSP on products is not automatically renewable; it is
therefore uncertain and its grant depends upon the
discretion of the grantor. Thus, GSP is not an integral part
of multinationalism on a permanent basis.
What does “multilateral world trade negotiations” stand
for? It is a mechanism whereby trade issues will be
negotiated multilaterally, and that forum is currently
provided by the World Trade Organisation. But these
negotiations , which have been going on for half a century,
have predominantly achieved tariff reductions and access
for certain products from developing countries under
certain conditions. The progress of the Kennedy Round
and Uruguay Round may seem to be remarkable in terms
of tariff reductions, but the objectives of foreign trade –
that is increase of foreign currency reserves or increase of
domestic investments in developing countries – have not
been remarkable. Furthermore, foreign trade, in most
cases, has not been a major runner to allow investment in
the infrastructural sector in the majority of developing
countries. Of course, internal policies of countries are also
important. However, one should nevertheless reflect on the
feasibility and effectiveness of multilateral trade
negotiations system.
What is mean by “market access”? Literally, speaking,
“market access” means access to a market. Access to a
market depends on the following: (a) high quality of goods;
(b) competitive price; (c) availability of market; and (d)
access by arrangement. Usually, developing countries in
most cases would not be able to satisfy the first three
conditions, other than the condition at (b). But, then, if
the quality of goods is not high for acceptance, the question
of satisfying the condition at (c) would not arise.
Availability of markets by multilateral arrangements is an
extremely difficult task to achieve, and this difficulty was
again experienced at Cancún. It would be a fantasy to think
that all developed countries will agree to sacrifice their
markets to developing countries. Furthermore, these
arrangements may not be made on a permanent basis, as
long-term arrangements may have adverse effect on the
economies of developed countries. The socio-political and
economic effect of such arrangements in developed
countries may be far-reaching.
Thus, the choice is to develop export trade, by which
market access is by means of bilateral arrangements. The
advantages of developing expert trade by means of bilateral
trading arrangements are manifold: (a) such arrangements
may be made with a country which can derive mutual
benefit, in the form of acquiring goods at a preferential
price; (b) skills may be made available to a developing
country from the developed country concerned; and (c)
under an investment treaty, goods for developed countries
may be manufactured in the developing country concerned
whereby the developed country requires high quality goods
at a cheaper price and the developing country would derive
benefits in the forms of increased employment, income
experience etc. Furthermore, bilateral trading
arrangements may be made on a counter-trade basis.
Bilateral trading arrangements may also be operated on
BOT (Built Operate and Trade) basis.
It is must be considered whether developing countries
should, as matter of policy, seek trade concessions and
market access. Both stand for discretionary grant from the
grantor. Instead, the time has come for them to utilise their
own resources effectively, human and otherwise, in an
attempt to minimise their dependence on others. One of
the means of relieving this would be to expand their
domestic markets, and gradually, their regional markets,
which are of similar standing.
It is also to be considered whether regional economic
arrangements constituted of developed countries deny
developing countries market access. Take for example, the 27
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European Union which will ultimately consist of 24
countries. Under the Accession Treaty, the EU has a
primary obligation to accommodate their products in the
EU market; furthermore, there is a priority to improve
their economies too. The EU market will be saturated with
products, primarily agricultural, from these countries. In
the circumstances, how could developing countries expect
to have appropriate market access to the European Union?
Now take the example of the Lomé regime. Under the
trade arrangement, the EU has committed itself to special
preferential treatment to the Lomé countries. The ACP EC
Cotonou Partnership Agreement strengthened the ACP EC
relations. During the Lomé IV and Lomé IV (bis) political
relations between the EU and ACP developed to such an
extreme that both parties agreed to its subsequent
institutionalisation in the Cotonou Agreement. This
Agreement provides for, inter alia, the broad guidelines for
comprehensive, balanced dialogue leading to commitment
on both sides between the signatory parties on peace,
management migration, conflict prevention etc. Trade
under Cotonou will be operated on a concession basis; the
capacity building of the ACP countries is the most
important factor for ACP countries. The ACP-EC Co-
operation does not exclusively assume market access.
One should then consider those developing countries
who are not parties to the Lomé regime. They are the
countries who have no choice other than to conclude
bilateral trading arrangements with some of the developed
countries. Thus, the portion of the countries in world trade
may be described in the following way:
Australia, Canada, Japan, New  Seven rich countries
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, outside the EU
the United States
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 15 EU members
Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 9 future EU
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, members
Romania and Slovak Republic,
Cyprus and perhaps Turkey
Others
(1) currently 79 ACP states Outsiders
(2) Other Asian including Iran and Israel, other countries
in the Middle East, and Latin America and in the
Eastern Bloc
This categorisation of countries should provide a clear
picture as to the trading prospects of developing countries
with developed countries. Once again, all rich countries are
primarily self-sufficient in their agricultural sector. Each of
them bears its own economic characteristics. Thus, no
general multilateral agreement may be achieved on the
basis of common elements by developing countries. On the
other hand, opportunities may exist for each of the
developing countries to develop bi-lateral arrangements
with developed countries. Furthermore, the European
Union has its priority obligations to honour in respect of
its member states. Thus, their market will be first open to
their own members, for both agriculture and industry. If
one takes 31 developed countries out of the equation for
the reasons stated above, the vast number of developing
states cannot possibly bring their limited markets to bear
upon the pressure from about 170 developing countries.
Some fundamental policy-making is necessary to protect
the position of developing countries. One of the ways to
protect them might be, as suggested before, to expand
their own domestic markets to create demands which
would give rise to other positive economic effect, such as
increase in employment, income etc. Developing countries
should also try to expand their markets within the
developing world. Bearing in mind that developed
countries are extremely advanced in technology, unless
exception exists, in general, developing countries may not
be able to compete with them; nor should they join the
technology race with developed countries. Instead, they
should improve their technological position by seeking
technical assistance on a bilateral basis.
Developing countries should also consider what has
actually been achieved through a multilateral trading
systems advocated by GATT/WTO, and by comparison, by
bilateral trading arrangements. Any multilateral trading
arrangement might not suit the special circumstances of a
state, but a bilateral arrangement can. Such arrangements
become more direct; cater for benefits of the country
concerned, and are usually based on the beneficiary’s
(developing country’s) interest.
Cancún should be regarded as an eye-opener for many.
One cannot and should not live on concessions. Living on
concessions granted by the stronger has a demoralising
effect on the beneficiary. Concession-giving runs counter
to the principle of equality in law, and perpetrates
dependency.
Developing countries should go to the root of the
problem: whether they should
not expand their markets, internally and externally, the
latter within similar economies, and they should seriously
consider the effect of regional economic integrations
constituted of developed countries upon developing
countries.
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